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In some recent papers, Chomsky has suggested some non-trivial analogies 
between the biolinguistic approach and evolutionary developmental biology 
(Evo-Devo). In this paper, the point is made that those analogies should be 
handled with caution. The reason is that the Evo-Devo version chosen by 
Chomsky in order to build the analogies fully assumes a gene-centric pers-
pective. Although providing genes with a special power fits in well with the 
Principles-and-Parameters model, it does not agree at all with the reduction 
of the power attributed to genes that the Minimalist Program has placed on 
the agenda. Nevertheless, other Evo-Devo approaches exist that seem more 
accurate than the particular version adopted by Chomsky — approaches 
therefore which are more promising for fulfilling the minimalist 
biolinguistic approach. 
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1. Introduction 
 
From its origins, Generative Grammar has compellingly argued that language is 
biologically seated. Therefore, Chomsky has repeatedly claimed that linguistics 
should be thought of as a branch of biology (apart from Chomsky 1980, see e.g. 
Chomsky 1975: 123, 1986: 27, 2000: 90, 2005: 2 for wide discussion). To be more 
precise, as Freidin & Vergnaud (2001: 648) put it, a branch of theoretical develop-
mental biology, because a core concern of Generative Grammar is to explain 
language growth in the individual. 
 Within this context, Chomsky has recently pointed out (see Chomsky 2007, 
2008, 2010) non-trivial analogies between the biolinguistic approach (henceforth, 
BA) and evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-Devo). Our paper makes the 
point that Chomsky’s analogies should be handled with caution. As Hall & Olson 
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(2003: xv) write, “no unified theory of evodevo exists”. This means that the Evo-
Devo perspective, according to which “[e]volution is biased by development” 
(Raff 2000: 78), can be implemented through different theories and assumptions. 
Chomsky’s analogies between the BA and Evo-Devo raise the problem that they 
are based on an Evo-Devo theory which is directly linked to developmental gen-
etics and which, accordingly, takes genes to have a core or special power, as re-
presented by Carroll (2005). To our mind, Chomsky’s analogies may be accurate 
as regards Principles-and-Parameters Theory (henceforth, PPT), but they do not 
sit properly with a truly minimalist BA. Therefore, for those analogies to be 
sustained, we suggest that the need exists to consider other Evo-Devo theories 
which reject gene-centrism or primacy of the genes. 
 
 
2. Chomsky’s Analogies 
 
According to Chomsky (2010: 45), there are “some analogies between ‘the Evo 
Devo revolution’ in biology and ideas that have been lurking in the background 
of biolinguistics since its origins […]”. The first one refers to the PPT.1 In that 
model, the principles of Universal Grammar (henceforth, UG), or linguistic geno-
type, were considered to be ‘open’, in such a way that enabled a narrow range of 
parametric variation. The setting of a principle P in the parameters A or B was 
considered to be triggered by the linguistic environment the learner is exposed to 
(Turkish, Spanish, etc.). Thus, grammars are the result of fixing the same prin-
ciples in different positions. This view has been nicely expressed by means of the 
well-known ‘switch metaphor’: 
 
We may think of the language faculty as a complex and intricate network of 
some sort associated with a switch box consisting of an array of switches 
that can be in one of two positions. [...]. The fixed network is the system of 
principles of universal grammar; the switches are the parameters to be fixed 
by experience. 
(Chomsky 1988: 62–63)  
 In the same vein, Evo-Devo has shown that “the same regulatory genes 
were shared by animals with different body plans (for example, insects and 
vertebrates)” (Raff 2000: 75). Minor changes in regulatory mechanisms produce 
very different results on the surface (see Carroll 2005 for a wide discussion).2 In 
fact, Chomsky (2007: 3) points out that PPT “was also suggested by major 
developments in general biology, specifically François Jacob’s account of how 
slight changes in the hierarchy and timing of regulatory mechanisms might yield 
great superficial differences ⎯ a butterfly or an elephant, and so on” (see also 
Chomsky 2010: 49). For obvious reasons, that model “seemed natural for lang-
uage as well; slight changes in parameter settings might yield superficial variety, 
                                                 
    1 Anyway, that analogy is not new; it can be traced back to Chomsky (1980: 66–67), although 
at that time the label ‘Evo-Devo’ had not yet been coined. 
    2 Carroll (2005: 111) also adopts the switch metaphor; he speaks of genetic switches, the 
switches controlling how genes are used, and which are crucial in the models of genetic ex-
pression and regulation. Thus, the same genes/linguistic principles are arranged differently 
in different organisms/languages. 
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through interaction of invariant principles with parameter choices” (Chomsky 
2007: 3).3 
 That situation meant the discovery, both in biology and in linguistics, of 
deep homologies among organisms on one side, and among languages on the 
other. Such a discovery reversed the traditional assumption of an “endless 
variation” (Boeckx 2009: 88) held by both disciplines. As regards language, Joos’s 
(1957: 96) claim that languages “can differ from each other without limit and in 
unpredictable ways” is well known. Generative Grammar showed that assump-
tion to be untenable. In biology, the prevailing assumption was very similar; as 
Mayr (1963: 609) put it, “[m]uch that has been learned about gene physiology 
makes it evident that the search for homologous genes is quite futile except in 
very close relatives”. That is, different genes for different animals. As Carroll 
(2005: 9) points out, “[f]or more than a century, biologists had assumed that 
different types of animals were genetically constructed in completely different 
ways”. Evo-Devo has shown, in the same vein as PPT, that such a contention was 
unjustified. 
 Chomsky’s (2010) second analogy between the BA and Evo-Devo has to do 
with third factor conditions, that is, “[p]rinciples not specific to the faculty of 
language” (Chomsky 2005: 6). According to Chomsky (2007: 3), “some of the 
third factor principles have the flavor of the constraints that enter into all facets 
of growth and evolution, and that are now being explored intensively in the evo-
devo revolution” (see also Chomsky 2010: 51). Therefore, Evo-Devo discoveries 
point to “architectural constraints that limit adaptive scope and channel evoluti-
onary patterns” (Chomsky 2010: 51). 
 Chomsky (2010: 45) asserts that “the analogies have been suggestive in the 
past, and might prove to be more than that in the years ahead”. This assertion 
suggests that both analogies apply to any stage of the BA, that is, both to the PPT 
and to the Minimalist Program (henceforth, MP). We contend, though, that 
whereas the first analogy is applicable to PPT, none of them can aptly character-
ize the minimalist BA. The reason is that the Evo-Devo approach referred to by 
Chomsky is a strictly gene-centered theory, and gene-centrism is explicitly reject-
ed by MP. To sum up, we will aim to show that the Evo-Devo version derived 
from developmental genetics is not an accurate analogy for the BA which MP has 
brought to the fore. 
 
 
3. On the Status of Evo-Devo 
 
The so-called Modern Synthesis (and the Neo-Darwinism which emerged from 
it) was undoubtedly a fundamental hallmark in biology: It gave rise to modern 
biology. However, some of their effects were clearly undesirable. One of them 
was gene-centrism (for criticism, see Goodwin 1994, Oyama 1985, Moore 2001, 
and our discussion below). Another undesirable outcome of Modern Synthesis 
                                                 
    3 Chomsky (1981: 3–4) already made the same point: “[T]he languages that are determined by 
fixing their values one way or another will appear to be quite diverse” (see also Chomsky 
1980: 66). 
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(and Neo-Darwinism) was to ignore development or, at least, leave it aside, thus 
favouring the dissociation between phylogeny and ontogeny (a wide consensus 
exists on this topic; see Griffiths & Gray 2001: 195, Robert et al. 2001: 954, Weber 
& Depew 2001: 239, Wimsatt 2001: 219; Robert 2002: 592, Gilbert 2003: 470–471, 
Gilbert & Burian 2003: 68–69, Carroll 2005: 6–8, and Jablonka & Lamb 2005: 27; 
for an in-depth analysis of the causes, see Robert 2004 and Amundson 2007). Two 
reasons underlie that dissociation: First, since Modern Synthesis, population gen-
etics has become the core discipline of Evolutionary Biology (Wimsatt 2001: 219). 
Population genetics studies the gradual change of genetic frequencies at the pop-
ulation level. Therefore, the definition of evolution within Modern Synthesis as a 
process affecting populations, not individuals, led to a non-developmentalist 
theory (Moore 2001: 167). Second, since Modern Synthesis, it has been considered 
(as pointed out above) that development involved different explanations for dif-
ferent animals (see Carroll 2005: 6). 
 This disagreement between evolution and development has been reversed 
by Evo-Devo, which has bridged the gap between both levels in such a way that 
evolution is accounted for by means of developmental factors. Indeed, Gould 
(2002: chap. 10) defines Evo-Devo as the evolution of development. More concre-
tely, Evo-Devo aims “to unveil how developmental processes and mechanisms 
become modified during evolution” (Baguñá & García Fernández 2003: 705).4 It is 
for that reason that, according to Fodor & Piattelli-Palmarini (2010: 30), Evo-Devo 
has made it possible to turn around Dobzhansky’s (1973) claim that “nothing in 
biology makes sense except in the light of evolution”; as Fodor & Piattelli-Palma-
rini put it, Evo-Devo “tells us that it’s the other way around: nothing in evolution 
makes sense except in the light of developmental biology”. 
 However, it should be noted that Evo-Devo is a general perspective, rather 
than a specific theory or model. This means that any theory which reliably links 
evolution and development will be an Evo-Devo theory, no matter how concre-
tely that relation will be implemented and approached. Accordingly, Hall & 
Olson (2003: xv) argue, as stated above, that “no unified theory of evodevo 
exists”, whereas Robert (2002: 597) makes the same point: “Like any field of 
biology, evo-devo commands a diverse range of theoretical perspectives and 
experimental approaches”. Indeed, Balari & Lorenzo (2009: 7) characterize at 
least three types of different (and even conflicting) Evo-Devo theories: (i) those 
assuming the ‘genetic program’ metaphor, (ii) those which extend the metaphor 
beyond genes and assume a developmental program, and (iii) those which com-
pletely abandon the idea of ‘program’, and take development to be the outcome 
of a developmental system. To sum up, all those approaches share “the idea that 
evolution is strongly constrained by the very same factors that strongly constrain 
the development of individuals” (Balari & Lorenzo 2009: 3); however, each 
concrete approach implements the same idea very differently. 
 Most of the disagreements among the several implementations of Evo-
Devo are to do with one of the main problems theoretical biology is concerned 
                                                 
    4 In the opinion of Robert et al. (2001: 956), the general objective of Evo-Devo can be decon-
structed as follows: (i) the relationship between embryonic development and evolution; (ii) 
how changes in developmental processes affect evolutionary change, and (iii) how develop-
ment itself has evolved (see also Hall 2000: 177). 
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with, that is, to integrate developmental biology within genetics and evolution-
ary theory, as pointed out by Weber & Depew (2001: 239)5: 
 
The field has been left to contestations between molecular reductionists, who 
assume that the problem of development is simply the problem of turning 
structural genes on and off, and those who identify in one way or another 
with the contemporary ‘developmentalist challenge’, who are confident that 
what genes do is far from the whole story.  
Let us note that the geneticist Evo-Devo approach (henceforth, Evo-
DevoGEN), finely represented by Carroll (2005), still assumes the primacy of genes 
which characterized Neo-Darwinism.6 And it should also be noted that this Evo-
DevoGEN is the approach taken by Chomsky in order to build the analogies with 
the BA (indeed, Chomsky 2007: 3 himself cites Carroll 2005, a leading practitioner 
of Evo-DevoGEN, as a representative instance of Evo-Devo). 
 
 
4. The Evo-Devo Approach Chosen by Chomsky 
 
As pointed out, Chomsky’s analogies between Evo-Devo and the BA are based 
on Evo-DevoGEN. Although, as Gould (2002: chap. 10) discusses, Evo-DevoGEN has 
changed relevant assumptions of orthodox Neo-Darwinism (which assumed that 
genes of different animals were different as well), in another respects Evo-
DevoGEN still accepts core Neo-Darwinian premises; for instance, the prominent 
role attributed to genes (and the notion of genetic program). However, it is our 
opinion that this primacy of the genes is in conflict with the reduction of the 
genetic endowment that MP has brought to the fore (see Chomsky 2005 for more 
discussion as well as sections 5 and 6 below). 
 The genetic primacy is clearly perceived in Carroll (2005). In fact, Carroll’s 
(2005: 8) initial claim that “genes must be at the center of the mysteries of both 
development and evolution” advances the content of the whole book. Carroll 
(2005: 9) reduces Evo-Devo to “the comparison of developmental genes between 
species”, an assumption which is denied by other Evo-Devo theories. More 
concretely, Carroll’s book is built around the notion of ‘genetic tool kit’, which is 
common to complex organisms. Therefore, the diversity of animal forms is not to 
do with different genes, but with how the same genes are used differently. 
According to Carroll (2005: 11), the development of form “depends upon the 
turning on and off of genes at different times and places in the course of develop-
ment”. That is, Carroll’s framework is entirely based on genes. 
 For that reason, Carroll’s recurrent references to the genome as the source 
of form (which point to the prominence of the notion of genetic program), do not 
come as a surprise. Carrol’s (2005) own words illustrate: 
 
                                                 
    5 See Walsh (2007) and Pigliucci (2007) as interesting attempts to widen the Modern Synthesis 
in the light of the findings raised by developmental biology. 
    6 Evo-DevoGEN derives from developmental genetics which emerged in the eighties (Raff 2000: 
75; Gilbert 2003: 473, Griffiths & Gray 2005: 421; see Gould 2002: chap. 10). For that reason, 
Goodman & Coughlin (2000) or Baguñá & García-Fernández (2003) conflate Evo-Devo with 
developmental genetics. 
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[…] the species-specific instructions for building an animal are encoded in 
its DNA […] (p. 11) 
 
Evolutionary changes within this regulatory DNA lead to the diversity of 
form (p. 12) 
 
This regulatory DNA contains the instructions for building anatomy (p. 12) 
 
Where do we look these rules and instructions [for generating animal form]? 
In DNA. In the entire complement of DNA of a species (the genome), there 
exists the information for building that animal. The instructions for making 
five fingers, or two eyespots, or six legs, or black and white stripes are 
somehow encoded in the genomes of the species that bear these traits (p. 35).  
 Therefore, according to Carroll (2005: 35), “[e]volution of form is ultimately 
then a question of genetics.” Balari & Lorenzo (2009: 6) argue that this under-
standing of Evo-DevoGEN “can safely be judged a constructive enlargement of the 
strictly genocentric model of the MES [Modern Evolutionary Synthesis — ABB & 
VML]”. That is, as the quotes above make clear, Evo-DevoGEN clearly assumes the 
Neo-Darwinian genocentrism (or dictatorship of the genes, following Goodwin 
1994), which means, in words of Oyama (2001: 177–178), to attribute a special 
directive power (both formative and informative) to the genes. 
 To make this point clearer, we should notice the great resemblance between 
Carroll’s assumptions and those of Neo-Darwinian scholars, like Dawkins (1976) 
or Maynard-Smith & Szathmáry (1999), who also argue for the existence of 
master plans within the genes: 
 
[…] the genes are not only the Andromedans [i.e. the devices — ABB & 
VML] who sent the coded instructions; they are also the instructions them-
selves (Dawkins 1976: 54).7  
[…] each egg contains, in its genes, a set of instructions for making the ap-
propriate adult. […] it is the information contained in the genes that 
specifies the adult form (Maynard-Smith & Szathmáry 1999: 2).  
The basic picture, then, is that the development of complex organisms de-
pends on the existence of genetic information, which can be copied by tem-
plate reproduction. Evolution depends on random changes in that genetic 
information, and the natural selection of those sets of instructions that spe-
cify the most successful organisms (Maynard-Smith & Szathmáry 1999: 2).  
 To sum up, we believe that Robert et al. (2001: 959) accurately contend that 
Evo-Devo “continues to show a tendency toward reductionism and gene-
centrism; developmental mechanisms are ultimately genetic”.8 Therefore, Evo-
DevoGEN does not run the risk of being gene-centric, as argued by Robert (2003a: 
479); indeed, Evo-DevoGEN is clearly gene-centric. 
 
 
                                                 
    7 See Dawkins (1976: chap. 3) for a wide exposition presenting genes as a collection of instruc-
tions for building the body. 
    8 For instance, Raff (2000: 74) writes that “[d]evelopment is genetically programmed”. Such a 
claim is strongly rejected by those who ‘take development seriously’, quoting Robert (2004) 
(see Blumberg 2005, Moore 2001, and Oyama et al. 2001a for wide discussion). 
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5. Is Evo-DevoGEN a Good Analogy for the Minimalist BA? 
 
The take-home message of the above discussion is the following: Evo-DevoGEN 
may be a fine analogy for the BA derived from the PPT. However, it is not an ac-
curate analogy as regards the minimalist BA. We develop both claims in turn. 
 As pointed out in Section 2, Evo-DevoGEN shows clear parallelisms with 
PPT. Besides from those raised by Chomsky, we would like to add another one: 
PPT shared the strong geneticism held by Evo-DevoGEN. PPT, and the remainder 
of the generative models previous to MP, took for granted the need to postulate 
the notion of ‘genetic program for language’ (Chomsky 1980: 234) or equivalent 
notions for characterizing UG.9 Lightfoot (1982: 22) illustrates that position: 
 
The genotypical principles responsible for language acquisition can be 
viewed as a theory of grammar, sometimes called Universal Grammar. This 
represents the genetic equipment that makes language growth possible.  
 That is, (non-minimalist) Generative Grammar considered the genes to be 
the primary or central cause, in the same way as in Evo-DevoGEN. The linguistic 
plan of the organism would lie in the genome, and this assumption has a clear 
parallelism in Evo-DevoGEN: The source of the form or body plan would lie in the 
genome, as Carroll’s previous statements made it clear (see Longa 2006, 2008, and 
Lorenzo & Longa 2009 on the generative gene-centrism). 
 For those reasons, we have argued before that Evo-DevoGEN could be an 
interesting analogy for PPT and for the BA arising from it. However, we do not 
share Chomsky’s (2010: 45) statement that “the analogies have been suggestive in 
the past, and might prove to be more than that in the years ahead”. Those analo-
gies are not valid for characterizing the BA arising from the minimalist agenda. 
That is because the minimalist BA abandons core assumptions of the previous 
models, like gene-centrism itself, and the notion of UG, which is reduced to a 
minimum. Thus, we do not really expect Evo-DevoGEN to inspire the minimalist 
research.10 We will justify the reasons (see Longa & Lorenzo 2008 for an exten-
sive analysis of differences between PPT and MP). 
 As specified above, all the models previous to MP, and PPT paradigma-
tically, assumed the need for postulating a “genetically determined initial state” 
(Chomsky 1980: 233) for explaining language growth in the individual. Such a 
                                                 
    9 Some of these notions being ‘linguistic genotype’ (Chomsky 1980: 65, Lightfoot 1982: 21, 
1999: 52, 2006: 45–46), ‘blueprint’ (Hyams 2002: 229), ‘genetic endowment’ (Anderson & 
Lightfoot 2002: 22, Guasti 2002: 271, Lightfoot 1982: 56), ‘genetic equipment’ (Guasti 2002: 
18, Lightfoot 1982: 22), or ‘genetic make-up’ (Thornton & Wexler 1999: 1). Given that frame-
work, Jenkins (1979: 106) characterized Generative Grammar as belonging to the “traditional 
study of the genetics of organisms”. 
    10 This means we consider that MP is not a mere extension of PPT nor does it presuppose its 
validity, as opposed to the ‘consensus view’ held by Boeckx (2006), Hornstein (2009), or 
Hornstein et al. (2005). The ‘consensus view’ contends that when agreement is reached about 
PPT as an optimal format to characterize Plato’s Problem, “an opening is created for simpli-
city, elegance, and naturalness to emerge from the long shadow cast by Plato’s problem” 
(Hornstein et al. 2005: 5). MP would be “the concrete application of such criteria to the anal-
ysis of UG” (Hornstein et al. 2005: 6). Thus, Hornstein (2009: 116) considers that MP does not 
replace the previous theory, but presupposes its validity, MP being a mere extension of 
PPT/GB. It seems to us that this analysis is based on a methodological minimalism instead 
of a really ontological one, following Martin & Uriagereka’s (2000) divide. 
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state, or UG, was conceived of as a body of specifically linguistic knowledge, that 
is, principles which “do not arise in other cognitive domains” (Tracy 2002: 656). 
According to that perspective, it is safe to say that “a strong background of gen-
etic instructions is supposed to govern the acquisition of grammars” (Lorenzo & 
Longa 2009: 1302). 
 MP, though, has sustained a great reduction of the role given to genetic 
endowment (such a reduction fitting in well with the analysis of alleged ‘genes of 
language’; see the wider discussion in Benítez Burraco 2009). Minimalism has 
therefore originated a new way of understanding the Faculty of Language 
(henceforth, FL), which is specially connected to the issue of language specificity: 
How specific or unspecific is language? The minimalist answer to that question is 
the opposite of the one suggested by the previous models. 
 Pre–minimalist models assumed as a basic statement that “the functioning 
of the language faculty is guided by special principles specific to this domain” 
(Chomsky 1980: 44), that is, principles of a purely grammatical nature, and “en-
coded in the genes of the children” (Smith 1999: 173). According to those models, 
FL was endowed with a high specificity. However, MP rejects that format, and 
assumes a language architecture which is characterized by its opposing state-
ment, unspecificity in FL. Minimalism considers that the mind does not require a 
specific grammatical system. From the view of the strongest minimalist thesis 
(Chomsky 2000), the best minimalist version is the version postulating the most 
direct connection (i.e. optimal) between the two external modules. That amounts 
to saying that the best minimalist version is the version containing a minimum of 
specific grammatical machinery (Lorenzo & Longa 2003), because that machinery 
would ‘disturb’ the direct nature of the relationship. 
 From that perspective, the structure of FL would be minimal, with no hints 
of specific principles; its mechanisms would have to do (i) with requirements im-
posed by the external modules, or (ii) with principles derived from conceptual 
necessity, which ‘come for free’, that is, the simplest solutions amongst all con-
ceivable ones, for which there is no need to postulate special stipulations in the 
form of grammatical principles arising from genetic instructions. For instance, 
movements of constituents are as short as possible not because that condition is 
stipulated by an autonomous grammatical module, as in GB, but because it is the 
most economical and efficient way for a computational system to operate. To 
summarize, from the viewpoint of MP, FL is the simplest way to productively 
link sounds and meanings. Thus, the specificity thesis argued for by the previous 
generative models and the unspecificity thesis sustained by MP are conceptually 
in conflict (for a wider analysis, see Longa & Lorenzo 2008).11 
 The unspecificity thesis has been made especially clear in Chomsky’s recent 
papers (Chomsky 2004 et seq.), which consider that the abandonment of gramma-
tical machinery will let us go “beyond explanatory adequacy” (Chomsky 2004), 
thus reaching a true principled explanation of language design. Chomsky (2005: 
6) proposes three factors in language growth: genetic endowment, external data 
                                                 
    11 In fact, Chomsky (2000: 113) clearly contends, as regards GB, that “a basic assumption of the 
work in [PPT], with its impressive achievements, is that everything just suggested [by MP; 
ABB & VML] is false: That language is ‘highly imperfect’ in these respects.” MP assumes 
quite the opposite: The optimal or perfect design of language. 
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(experience), and “principles not specific to the faculty of language” — those 
principles comprising, amongst others, principles of structural architecture, effici-
ent computation, etc. The point in order is that MP’s unspecificity thesis leads to 
the primacy of the third factor; as Chomsky (2005: 9) points out, “we need no 
longer assume that the means of generating expressions are highly articulated 
and specific to language. We can seriously entertain the possibility that they 
might be reducible to language-independent principles”. 
 This way, the minimalist proposal of reducing the role of genes in language 
growth leads to reducing the UG to a minimum. That means, as clearly stated by 
Chomsky (2005: 9), that MP crucially implies “shifting the burden of explanation 
from the first factor, the genetic endowment, to the third factor, language-
independent principles of data processing, structural architecture, and compu-
tational efficiency”. It is in this sense that the notion of (a rich) genetic program 
for language seems to be ill-suited from a minimalist perspective.12 To sum up, 
we claim that, if the minimalist unspecificity thesis is seriously considered, the 
assumption of a highly detailed structure of purely linguistic knowledge, as sus-
tained by GB, should be replaced by another according to which the initial state 
should be freed from any grammatical residue (Lorenzo & Longa 2003). This 
means the abandonment of gene-centrism by MP. 
 To summarize the discussion, if the differences opposing Evo-DevoGEN 
(based on the notion of genetic program), and the minimalist BA (which avoids 
that notion), are considered, Evo-DevoGEN does not seem an accurate analogy for 
the minimalist BA. 
 
 
6. Are There Analogies between the Third Factor and Evo-DevoGEN Constraints? 
 
As pointed out above, Chomsky’s second analogy between Evo-Devo and the BA 
refers to the third factor conditions. According to Chomsky (2007: 3), “some of 
the third factor principles have the flavor of the constraints that enter into all 
facets of growth and evolution, and that are now being explored intensively in 
the evo-devo revolution”, because evo-devo discoveries point to “architectural 
constraints that limit adaptive scope and channel evolutionary patterns” (Choms-
ky 2010: 51). However, to our mind, this analogy is not accurate either, if referred 
to Evo-DevoGEN. 
 It is safe to argue that Evo-DevoGEN has shown that not every organic de-
sign is feasible. This topic is emphasized by Gould’s (2002: chap. 10) discussion of 
Evo-Devo. This author claims that Neo-Darwinism attributed an excessive power 
to natural selection. If this mechanism had the power it is usually endowed with, 
more than 500 million years of independent evolution should suffice to erase any 
trace of genetic homology, that is, adaptive evolution should have reconstructed 
every locus over and over again to face the changing requirements of changing 
environments (see Goodwin 1994: 116–121 for a similar argument related to the 
                                                 
    12 As Lorenzo & Longa (2009: 1306) point out, even if a minimal version of UG were found to 
be necessary for explaining language growth, its residual character would prevent to consi-
der it as an articulated blueprint of language. 
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models of phylotaxis). Therefore, Gould considers natural selection to have a re-
stricted scope, as opposed to Neo-Darwinist expectations. 
 That said, we believe that the minimalist third factor conditions and the ar-
chitectural constraints brought to the fore by Evo-DevoGEN cannot be conflated or 
compared: Practitioners of Evo-DevoGEN attribute those constraints to purely gen-
etic factors. For instance, Carroll (2005: 64) claims that “these Hox genes were so 
important that their sequences have been preserved throughout this enormous 
span of animal evolution [since the Cambrian to the present — ABB & VML]”. A 
quite similar statement is made by Raff (2000: 76): Those architectural constraints 
are due to “deeply conserved gene expression patterns”, which in turn are motiv-
ated by the fact that “the same regulatory genes have conserved roles in develop-
ment” (Raff 2000: 75). As we can appreciate, the explanation raised by Evo-
DevoGEN to account for those architectural constraints is merely genetic, the evo-
lutionary novelties arising because “conserved genes and gene pathways can be 
and are co–opted to new functions” (Raff 2000: 76). (This issue is widely analyzed 
in Carroll (2005) by means of the genetic switches of the genes, which can aug-
ment in number but where switches already existing are preserved.) 
 We think that Evo-DevoGEN‘s geneticist view of constraints on animal form 
is very different from what third factor effects actually mean: Third factor prin-
ciples are based on the opposite premise, conditions which spontaneously arise, 
with no role for genetic specifications. Furthermore, it should be noted that these 
principles do not depend on the environment, but derive from the dynamics of 
the system itself (in this case, language). However, Evo-DevoGEN’s opinion on that 
matter is different. For instance, Carroll (2005: 165) states that genes from the 
toolkit represent possibilities, but the actual fulfillment of potential is ecologically 
guided. More specifically, “the realization of this power is shaped, of course, by 
natural selection” (Carroll 2005: 287). Sincerely, we do not find many differences 
from the Neo-Darwinian view on natural selection. According to Carroll, gene 
stability and gene expression patterns are due to their functionality.13 
 That is, again, the opposite of the meaning of the third factor effects argued 
for by the minimalist BA. Therefore, Chomsky’s analogy does not seem to be 
valid. It could well be valid if Chomsky referred to an Evo-Devo approach differ-
ent from the geneticist one. If this were the case, though, Chomsky should ex-
plicitly point that out. In fact, one of the research programs that Müller (2007: 
943) recognizes in Evo-Devo points to “properties of development that are not 
directly genetically determined, such as self-organization or geometric and phy-
sical factors.” This view would agree with Chomsky’s position; however, such a 
view seems absent from Evo-DevoGEN. 
 
 
7. Therefore: Which Evo-Devo — If Any? 
 
We have argued that Chomsky’s election (i.e. Evo-DevoGEN) in order to draw an-
                                                 
    13 This seems to cast doubt on Fodor & Piattelli-Palmarini’s (2010: 32) claim that Evo-Devo 
findings on gene conservation imply internal filters in the phenotypes on which exogenous 
selection operates. 
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alogies between Evo-Devo and the BA does not fit in at all with MP. Does this 
mean that we should avoid any kind of analogy between the minimalist BA and 
Evo-Devo? Not really. We should keep in mind that the Evo-Devo perspective 
can be implemented through several theories; any theory reliably linking evo-
lution and development will undoubtedly be an Evo-Devo theory, even although 
it does not share Evo-DevoGEN’s strongly geneticist assumptions. 
 If the reduction of the role of genetic endowment raised by MP is 
considered, in order to draw analogies between Evo-Devo and the minimalist BA 
an Evo-Devo theory rejecting gene-centrism and the notion of genetic program 
should be chosen. Such an Evo-Devo theory could well be Developmental Sys-
tems Theory (henceforth, DST; see Oyama 1985, 2000, Oyama et al. 2001b; see also 
Longa 2008 and Lorenzo & Longa 2009 for a implementation of the minimalist 
framework from the DST view). 
 DST is a general theoretical perspective on development, heredity, and evo-
lution, according to which the need exists to reduce the importance that genes 
were traditionally given. According to DST, development does not entail any 
kind of pre–existing genetic program; genes are not the source of the form. Quite 
the opposite: Genes are just one of many developmental resources. Therefore, 
DST rejects the idea that genes are endowed with any special directive power.14 
The main notion of DST is that of ‘developmental system’, which is to be under-
stood as the overall collection of heterogeneous influences on development. 
 DST’s key idea is represented by the so-called ‘parity thesis’: “Parity is the 
idea that genes and other material causes are on a par” (Griffiths & Gray 1998: 
254), this thesis having its source in Oyama’s (1985: 201) ‘parity of reasoning’. 
According to DST, development arises from interaction between a wide number 
of heterogeneous resources and factors, all of them necessary (not only genetic 
ones) for development to take place.15 Accordingly, it is not possible to provide 
genes with any special formative power, nor is it possible to consider that genes 
contain the master plan of the organism either (on DST features, see Oyama et al. 
2001a, Robert et al. 2001, Robert 2003b, or Longa 2006, 2008). DST contends that 
phylogeny is simply the derivational history of developmental systems (Oyama 
1985: 179), and is explainable through a progressive modification of those sys-
tems. 
 We think that DST seems more promising than Evo-DevoGEN for drawing 
analogies with the minimalist BA. Anyway, DST is not the only Evo-Devo theory 
suitable for approaching such an objective. Other Evo-Devo theories could be sui-
table for such a task; for instance, the view represented by West-Eberhard (2003), 
which relies on the concept of phenotypic plasticity. According to Walsh (2007: 
193), such an approach “reverses the causal priority of genotype over phenotype 
in evolution that is the cornerstone of sub–organismal, replicator interpretation of 
the modern synthesis. Phenotypic novelties are initiated in development and not 
by mutation.” 
                                                 
    14 As Oyama (2000: 118) puts it, “a gene is a resource among others rather than a directing in-
telligence that uses resources for its own ends”. 
    15 In this sense, the third factor deserves careful consideration because it widens the ‘conven-
tional interactionism’, to put it in Oyama’s (2000) term, between genes and environment 
which traditionally characterized Generative Grammar; see Lorenzo & Longa (2009). 
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8. Conclusion 
 
This paper has aimed to show that the analogies between the minimalist BA and 
the Evo-Devo version adopted by Chomsky (Evo-DevoGEN) do not seem applic-
able to the minimalist BA. Evo-devoGEN is a gene-centric theory, and its essence 
does not agree at all with the reduction of the power attributed to genes that MP 
has placed on the agenda. In order to establish more productive analogies, it 
would be necessary to adopt another Evo-Devo version that, at least, assumes the 
parity thesis. This is not made by the approach represented by Sean Carroll. If the 
minimalist BA is to be seriously considered, our conclusion is clear: Evo-Devo, of 
course, but not Evo-DevoGEN. 
 To put it in other words, Boeckx (2006: 10) wrote that minimalism “may 
well turn out to provide remarkable support for a silent revolution in biology 
(often called the Evo Devo revolution)”. We strongly agree, but we believe that 
minimalism will not provide any kind of support for Evo-DevoGEN. 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Amundson, Ron. 2007. The Changing Role of the Embryo in Evolutionary Thought: 
Roots of Evo-Devo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Anderson, Stephen R. & David Lightfoot. 2002. The Language Organ: Linguistics as 
Cognitive Physiology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Baguñá, Jaume & Jordi García-Fernández. 2003. Evo-Devo: The long and winding 
road. International Journal of Developmental Biology 47, 705–713. 
Balari, Sergio & Guillermo Lorenzo. 2009. Computational phenotypes: Where the 
theory of computation meets evo-devo. Biolinguistics 3, 2–60. 
Benítez Burraco, Antonio. 2009. Genes y Lenguaje: Aspectos Ontogenéticos, Filogené-
ticos y Cognitivos. Barcelona: Reverté. 
Blumberg, Mark S. 2005. Basic Instinct: The Genesis of Behavior. New York: Thun-
der’s Mouth Press. 
Boeckx, Cedric. 2006. Linguistic Minimalism: Origins, Concepts, Methods, and Aims. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Boeckx, Cedric. 2009. Language in Cognition: Uncovering Mental Structures and the 
Rules Behind Them. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Carroll, Sean B. 2005. Endless Forms Most Beautiful: The New Science of Evo Devo and 
the Making of the Animal Kingdom. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 
Chomsky, Noam. 1975. Reflections on Language. New York: Pantheon. 
Chomsky, Noam. 1980. Rules and Representations. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Chomsky, Noam. 1981. Lectures on Government and Binding. Dordrecht: Foris. 
Chomsky, Noam. 1986. Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origins, and Use. New 
York: Praeger. 
Chomsky, Noam. 1988. Language and the Problems of Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
A. Benítez Burraco & V. M. Longa 
 
320 
Chomsky, Noam. 2000. Minimalist inquiries: The framework. In Roger Martin, 
David Michaels & Juan Uriagereka (eds.), Step by Step: Essays on Minimalist 
Syntax in Honor of Howard Lasnik, 89–155. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Chomsky, Noam. 2004. Beyond explanatory adequacy. In Adriana Belletti (ed.), 
The Cartography of Syntactic Structures, vol. 3. Structures and Beyond, 104–131. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Chomsky, Noam. 2005. Three factors in language design. Linguistic Inquiry 36, 1–
22. 
Chomsky, Noam. 2007. Approaching UG from below. In Uli Sauerland & Hans-
Martin Gärtner (eds.), Interfaces + Recursion = Language? Chomsky’s Minima-
lism and the View from Syntax–Semantics, 1–29. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Chomsky, Noam. 2008. The biolinguistic program: Where does it stand today? 
Ms., MIT. 
Chomsky, Noam. 2010. Some simple evo devo theses: How true might they be for 
language. In Richard K. Larson, Viviane Déprez & Hiroko Yamakido (eds.), 
The Evolution of Language: Biolinguistic Perspectives, 45–62. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press. 
Dawkins, Richard. 1976. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Dobzhansky, Theodosius. 1973. Nothing in biology makes sense except in the 
light of evolution. American Biology Teacher 35, 125–129. 
Fodor, Jerry & Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini. 2010. What Darwin Got Wrong. New 
York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. 
Freidin, Robert & Jean-Roger Vergnaud. 2001. Exquisite connections: Some 
remarks on the evolution of linguistic theory. Lingua 111, 639–666. 
Gilbert, Scott F. 2003. The morphogenesis of evolutionary developmental biology. 
International Journal of Developmental Biology 47, 467–477. 
Gilbert, Scott F. & Richard M. Burian. 2003. Developmental genetics. In Brian K. 
Hall & Wendy M. Olson (eds.), Keywords & Concepts in Evolutionary Develop-
mental Biology, 68–74. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Goodman, Corey S. & Bridget C. Coughlin. 2000. Introduction: The evolution of 
evo-devo biology. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 97, 4424–
4425. 
Goodwin, Brian 1994. How the Leopard Changed Its Spots: The Evolution of Complex-
ity. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 
Gould, Stephen J. 2002. The Structure of Evolutionary Theory. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press. 
Griffiths, Paul E. & Russell D. Gray. 2001. Darwinism and developmental sys-
tems. In Oyama et al. (2001b), 195–218. 
Griffiths, Paul E. & Russell D. Gray. 2004. The developmental systems 
perspective: Organism-environment systems as units of development and 
evolution. In Massimo Pigliucci & Katherine Preston (eds.), The Evolutionary 
Biology of Complex Phenotypes, 409–431. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Griffiths, Paul E. & Russell D. Gray. 2005. Discussion: Three ways to misunder-
stand developmental systems theory. Biology & Philosophy 20, 417–425. 
Griffiths, Paul & Robin D. Knight. 1998. What is the developmentalist challenge? 
Philosophy of Science 65, 253–258. 
Evo-Devo — Of Course, But Which One? 
 
321 
Guasti, Maria Teresa. 2002. Language Acquisition: The Growth of Grammar. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Hall, Brian K. 2000. Guest Editorial: Evo-devo or devo-evo ⎯ does it matter? 
Evolution & Development 2(4), 177–178. 
Hall, Brian K. & Wendy M. Olson. 2003. Introduction: Evolutionary develop-
mental mechanisms. In Brian K. Hall & Wendy M. Olson (eds.), Keywords & 
Concepts in Evolutionary Developmental Biology, xiii–xvi. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Hornstein, Norbert. 2009. A Theory of Syntax: Minimal Operations and Universal 
Grammar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hornstein, Norbert, Jairo Nunes & Kleanthes K. Grohmann. 2005. Understanding 
Minimalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hyams, Nina. 2002. Clausal structure in child Greek: A reply to Varlokosta, 
Vainikka and Rohrbacher and a reanalysis. The Linguistic Review 19, 225–
269. 
Jablonka, Eva & Marion Lamb. 2005. Evolution in Four Dimensions. Genetic, Epige-
netic, Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Jenkins, Lyle. 1979. The genetics of language. Linguistics and Philosophy 3, 105–119. 
Joos, Martin (ed.). 1957. Readings in Linguistics. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Lightfoot, David. 1982. The Language Lottery: Toward a Biology of Grammars. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Lightfoot, David. 1999. The Development of Language: Acquisition, Change, and Evo-
lution. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lightfoot, David. 2006. How New Languages Emerge. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 
Longa, Víctor M. 2006. No sólo genes: El Programa Minimalista y la reformu-
lación de la noción de innatismo. Ludus Vitalis: Revista de Filosofía de las 
Ciencias de la Vida XIV, 141–170. 
Longa, Víctor M. 2008. Una visión crítica sobre la noción de ‘programa genético’ 
desde la biología y la lingüística: Consecuencias para la conceptualización 
de la ontogenia del lenguaje. Verba 35, 347–385. 
Longa, Víctor M. & Guillermo Lorenzo. 2008. What about a (really) minimalist 
theory of language acquisition? Linguistics 46, 541–570. 
Lorenzo, Guillermo & Víctor M. Longa. 2003. Minimizing the genes for grammar: 
The Minimalist Program as a biological framework for the study of lang-
uage. Lingua 113, 643–657. 
Lorenzo, Guillermo & Víctor M. Longa. 2009. Beyond generative geneticism: Re-
thinking language acquisition from a developmentalist point of view. 
Lingua 119, 1300–1315. 
Martin, Roger & Juan Uriagereka. 2000. Introduction: Some possible foundations 
of the Minimalist Program. In Roger Martin, David Michaels & Juan Uri-
agereka (eds.), Step by Step: Essays on Minimalist Syntax in Honor of Howard 
Lasnik, 1–29. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Maynard-Smith, John & Eörs Szathmáry. 1999. The Origins of Life: From the Birth of 
Life to the Origin of Language. New York: Oxford University Press. 
A. Benítez Burraco & V. M. Longa 
 
322 
Mayr, Ernst. 1963. Animal Species and Evolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press. 
Moore, David S. 2001. The Dependent Gene: The Fallacy of ‘Nature vs. Nurture’. New 
York: W.H. Freeman. 
Müller, Gerd B. 2007. Evo-devo: extending the evolutionary synthesis. Nature Re-
view Genetics 8, 943–949. 
Oyama, Susan. 1985. The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental Systems and Evo-
lution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2nd edn. published in 2000, 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press). 
Oyama, Susan. 2000. Evolution’s Eye: A Systems View of the Biology-Culture Divide. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Oyama, Susan. 2001. Terms in tension: What do you do when all the good words 
are taken? In Oyama et al. (2001b), 177–193. 
Oyama, Susan, Paul E. Griffiths & Russell D. Gray. 2001a. Introduction: What is 
Developmental Systems Theory? In Oyama et al. (2001b), 1–11. 
Oyama, Susan, Paul E. Griffiths & Russell D. Gray (eds.). 2001b. Cycles of Contin-
gencies: Developmental Systems and Evolution. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Pigliucci, Massimo. 2007. Do we need an extended evolutionary synthesis? Evo-
lution 61, 2743–2749. 
Raff, Rudolf A. 2000. Evo-devo: The evolution of a new discipline. Nature Reviews 
Genetics 1, 74–79. 
Robert, Jason Scott. 2002. How developmental is evolutionary developmental bio-
logy? Biology & Philosophy 17, 591–611. 
Robert, Jason Scott. 2003a. Developmental Systems and animal behavior. Critical 
notice of Evolution’s Eye: A Systems View of the Biology–Culture Divide. Biolo-
gy & Philosophy 18, 477–489. 
Robert, Jason Scott. 2003b. Developmental systems theory. In Brian K. Hall & 
Wendy M. Olson (eds.), Keywords & Concepts in Evolutionary Developmental 
Biology, 94–97. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Robert, Jason Scott. 2004. Embryology, Epigenesis, and Evolution: Taking Development 
Seriously. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Robert, Jason Scott, Brian K. Hall & Wendy M. Olson. 2001. Bridging the gap bet-
ween developmental systems theory and evolutionary developmental bio-
logy. BioEssays 23, 954–962. 
Smith, Neil. 1999. Chomsky: Ideas and Ideals. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Thornton, Rosalind & Kenneth Wexler. 1999. Principle B, Ellipsis, and Interpretation 
in Child Grammar. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Tracy, Rosemarie. 2002. Growing (clausal) roots: All children start out (and many 
remain) multilingual. Linguistics 40, 653–686. 
Walsh, Denis M. 2007. Development: Three grades of ontogenetic involvement. In 
Mohan Matthen & Christopher Stephens (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of 
Science: Philosophy of Biology, 179–199. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Weber, Bruce H. & David J. Depew. 2001. Developmental systems, Darwinian 
evolution, and the unity of science. In Oyama et al. (2001b), 239–253. 
West-Eberhard, Mary J. 2003. Developmental Plasticity and Evolution. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press. 
Evo-Devo — Of Course, But Which One? 
 
323 
Wimsatt, William C. 2001. Generative entrenchment and the developmental sys-
tems approach to evolutionary processes. In Oyama et al. (2001b), 219–237. 
 
 
 
 
Antonio Benítez Burraco       Víctor M. Longa 
Universidad de Huelva        Universidad de Santiago de Compostela 
Departamento de Filología Española y    Departamento de Literatura Española, Teoría de  
    sus Didácticas, Campus de “El Carmen”      la Literatura y Lingüística General 
Avda. Fuerzas Armadas s/n.      Plaza Isabel la Católica, 2, 2º E 
ES–21071 Huelva         ES–36204 Vigo 
Spain             Spain 
antonio.benitez@dfesp.uhu.es      victormanuel.longa@usc.es 
